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Abstract
When will solidarity, which emerges spontaneously from the fear of spillovers,
be reinforced through contracting? The optimal pact between countries that differ
substantially in their probability of distress is a simple debt contract with market fi-
nancing, a borrowing cap, but no joint liability. While joint liability augments total
surplus, the borrowing country cannot compensate the deep-pocket guarantor.
By contrast, the optimal pact between two countries symmetrically exposed to
shocks with an arbitrary correlation is a simple debt contract with joint liability,
provided that shocks are sufficiently independent, spillovers sufficiently large, liq-
uidity needs moderate and available sanctions sufficiently tough.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing Eurozone crisis has sparked a vivid controversy on country solidarity:
Should Eurozone countries continue to informally stand by to, if they so wish, secure
their peers’ access to borrowing? Or should Europeans reinforce their solidarity by
issuing Eurobonds, with full joint-and-several liability, or through other formal risk
sharing mechanisms such as a common deposit or unemployment insurance scheme?
The crisis also raises the question of the perimeter of the solidarity area. The policy
debate, negotiations and actual bailout policies all take it for granted that, just as it
fell to the US to rescue Mexico in 1995, Eurozone countries are the natural providers
of insurance to each other; even non-Eurozone European countries are exempted from
contributing to bailouts.1 This assumption is at first sight puzzling. After all, insurance
economics points at the desirability of spreading risk broadly, rather than allocating
it to a small group of countries, which moreover may face correlated risk. Indeed,
alternative cross-insurance mechanisms, such as the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line, the
Chiang Mai Initiative, or credit lines offered to countries by consortia of banks, already
exist, that do not involve insurance among countries within a monetary zone.
In analyzing the determinants of international solidarity and their impact on insti-
tutions and sovereign borrowing, this paper distinguishes between two forms of sol-
idarity: ex post (spontaneous) and ex ante (contractual). Ex post, the impacted coun-
tries may stand by the troubled country because they want to avoid the externality or
collateral damage inflicted by the latter’s default. Ex ante, they may commit to sup-
port levels beyond what they would spontaneously offer ex post, through joint-and-
several liability or alternative risk-sharing mechanisms. Spontaneous and contractual
bailouts, which respectively correspond roughly to the European approach to date and
to the various Eurobonds proposals, are not equivalent.
First, and as will be much emphasized in the first part of the paper, joint-and-several
liability redistributes resources from healthy countries to fragile ones as the latter have
no means to compensate the former for the resulting insurance (they would have to
borrow even more to do that). Second, even in the absence of initial asymmetries,
joint liability affects the countries’ borrowing capability and probability of default. A
failure to stand by a failing country implies a cost of own default on top of the collateral
damage incurred when the failing country defaults. Joint liability therefore may create
domino effects and increase default costs if the guarantor does not have deep pockets.
Conversely, it reduces the occurrence of default if debt levels are moderate enough so
as to allow the guarantor to stand by its promise to cover the other country’s debt if
1While the IMF has large programs in the Eurozone, the brunt of the risk is borne by Eurozone
countries and the ECB.
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needed.
The paper investigates when countries are willing to extend solidarity by entering
ex-ante risk sharing arrangements. It looks at optimal contracts in two environments.
In the asymmetric case, a risky country (the “agent”) under laissez-faire borrows from
the market; when defaulting, it exerts an externality on some other country (the “prin-
cipal”), which has deep pockets. The latter, anticipating this externality or the cost of
rescuing the borrower, can enter an optimal ex-ante agreement so to limit the amount
borrowed from the market by the risky country and to bring extra support in case of
borrower distress. In the symmetric case, both countries borrow and are risky. They
therefore can exert negative default externalities on each other. Again we look at bar-
gaining for the optimal contract between the two countries, with the status-quo point
given by individually-optimal borrowing from the market. Let us now describe these
two cases in more detail.
Section 2 sets up the asymmetric model. The borrowing country’s income realiza-
tion (or equivalently its willingness to accept sacrifices) is unobserved by third parties,
and there are states of nature in which the country cannot (or does not want to) repay.
The country’s default imposes a negative externality or collateral damage on the other
country. The latter, who has a priori no comparative advantage relative to the mar-
ket in lending to the borrowing country, may thus be willing to assume some of the
borrowing country’s debt to prevent collateral damages.
The narrowness of the tax base (that is, who stands for the “principal” in this model)
is then rationalized by the heterogeneity in countries’ willingness to stand by the fail-
ing country: Countries that have a larger stake in avoiding a country’s default are
more likely to bail out that country. Consequently, a borrowing country’s collateral
is provided by the collateral damage its default creates onto peer countries, in short
by its nuisance power. The collateral damage cost admits both economic and politi-
cal considerations. Economic spillovers include reduced trade, banking exposures and
the fear of a run on other countries. The end of the European construction would in-
volve a sizeable political cost; non-Eurozone political costs are evidenced by various
countries’ access to cash through their nuisance power (collapse of USSR and fear of
nuclear weapons proliferation, assistance to North Korea, US support to Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan or Israel) or conversely bailouts motivated by the desire to gain geopolitical
influence.2 Yet another non-economic motivation for bailing out another country is
2As Roubini (2004) notes, “Even before the September 11 events, but more so afterwards, the U.S. tendency
to support financial aid to countries that are considered as friends, allies or otherwise strategically or systemically
important (Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and possibly Brazil) has clearly emerged, more strongly than during the
previous administration. Even in the case of Argentina, where IMF support was eventually cut off leading to
the sovereign default of this country, political considerations have been dominant: the August 2001 augmented
package was pushed for political rather than economic reasons.”
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empathy, be it driven by ethnic, religious, vicinity or other considerations.
Under laissez-faire, the borrowing country borrows from foreign private creditors
without ex ante contracting with the principal. Unregulated borrowing in general gen-
erates overborrowing from the point of view of the principal. A Pareto improvement
may then be obtained through a contract between the agent and the principal. Whether
gains from trade can be realized however is not a foregone conclusion; for, borrowing
environments are by essence ones of non-transferable utility.
The ex-ante optimal contract, studied in Section 3, differs from laissez-faire when
the borrowing country’s liquidity needs (the benefit from borrowing) are intermediate:
for low needs, the country does not borrow while for very high liquidity needs, the
country borrowing to the hilt maximizes joint surplus subject to the agent’s incentive
constraint. By contrast, for intermediate needs, ex-ante contracting is desirable and, in
exchange of a transfer from the principal, specifies a cap on private sector borrowing.3
In general, the optimal contract strictly requires borrowing from the private sector.
This surplus-creating role of the private market may sound surprising in view of the
assumption that the market and the principal have no relative advantage in lending,
as they are equally patient and do not observe the income realization/willingness to
reimburse debt. However, any sanction inflicted upon the agent negatively impacts
the welfare of the principal, but not that of the investors who have lent to the country.
The spillover effect means that, unlike the market, the principal lacks credibility in
imposing sanctions on the agent.
Furthermore, and a central result of our analysis, the optimal contract in the asym-
metric case is a simple debt contract and involves no joint-and-several liability. The
intuition goes as follows: Joint liability allows the debtor country to borrow more by
making it more credible that it will be bailed out in case of hardship. But, because the
absence of cash is the essence of borrowing, it has no ability to compensate the guar-
antor for the extra involvement. Thus, asymmetric situations in which the potential
guarantor is unlikely to enter distress lead to an implicit form of solidarity (ex-post
bailouts), but no explicit solidarity.
By contrast, in the symmetric environment studied in Section 4, in which the two
countries borrow, are risky and inflict symmetric collateral damages upon each other
when defaulting, borrowing countries have a “currency” with which to pay for the
formal insurance they receive through joint-and-several liability: they can reciprocate
by offering their guarantor some insurance in a situation in which the fortunes are
reversed. We show that joint-and-several liability (cum joint monitoring of countries’
3This conclusion is in line with standard models of sovereign borrowing, which predict that countries
will spontaneously cap their borrowing so as to make their repayment credible; but the borrowing cap
is here conditioned by the externality imposed on the official sector by high debt.
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indebtedness) then may emerge as part of the optimal arrangement. More precisely,
joint liability (in contrast with currency areas) is optimal provided that country shocks
are sufficiently independent, liquidity needs moderate, available sanctions sufficiently
tough, and spillovers sufficiently large.
The redistributive consideration is absent in the symmetric case. Only the impacts
of joint liability on borrowing capability and probability of default are relevant. In-
tuitively, under joint liability, countries will want to keep their borrowing moderate
as they have to factor in their extra obligation to come to the other country’s rescue
if needed (domino effects play an important role in constraining borrowing, but are
avoided in an efficient pact); so joint liability is in fact associated with a reduced bor-
rowing capability. On the other hand, joint liability creates insurance opportunities
between two countries: default then occurs only when both countries are in distress;
by contrast, insurance opportunities are limited under individual liability because each
country is then too indebted to be willing or able to rescue the other country. Contrac-
tual solidarity must thus trade off the cost from reduced borrowing capability against
the reduction in the probability of default. High liquidity needs favor high borrow-
ing and therefore the absence of joint liability. By contrast, high collateral damages
and a lack of correlation of shocks both make the reduction in default probability and
therefore joint liability attractive.
Section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes with some alleys for future
research.
Relationship to the literature : The literature on sovereign defaultable debt4 has two
(complementary) strands. One line, starting with Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) (e.g.,
Sachs 1984; Krugman 1985; Eaton et al 1986, Bulow and Rogoff 1989 b, Fernandez and
Rosenthal 1990), stresses the deterring effect of sanctions, such as trade embargoes,
seizure of assets or military interventions. An increase in the cost of default makes the
country more prone to repay, but raises the cost of default when the latter occurs due to
particularly low resources. Dellas and Niepelt (2012) assume that the cost of default is
higher when defaulting on the official sector, as the latter can avail itself of a different
set of sanctions. They thereby obtain an optimal mix of private and official sector
borrowing, that delivers the optimal sanction. On the empirical front, Rose (2005)
shows that debt renegotiations imply a substantial and long-lasting decline in trade.5
4See e.g., chapter 6 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) for re-
views of this literature. The following obviously does not do justice to this very rich literature. For
example, it leaves aside the large literature on self-fulfilling liquidity crises initiated by Calvo (1988).
5In Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), the debtor, when repaying in full, receives a “bonus”, not paid
by the creditor, and interpreted as an improved access to international markets. They show that cred-
itors forgive enough of the debt so as to incentivize the debtor to eventually repay in full. Mitchener
and Weidenmier (2010) study “supersanctions” (gunboat diplomacy, seizure of railway assets, foreign
administration to collect customs and taxes...) during the gold exchange standard period (1870-1913)
5
Another line emphasizes that default tarnishes the country’s reputation and lim-
its its future access to international financial markets. On the theory side, Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) also developed a model in which sovereign borrowing serves to smooth
country consumption and reimbursement is enforced by the threat of being excluded
from international capital markets. Kletzer (1984) is the first paper to consider asym-
metric information in sovereign debt; it uses the punishment threat of a credit embargo
to enforce payments. Bulow and Rogoff (1989 a) argued that reputational concerns
per se may not create access to international finance: a country cannot borrow if it
can still save at going rates of interest after default. Some of the subsequent litera-
ture revisited Bulow and Rogoff’s provocative analysis. Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009)
showed that borrowing is feasible under maintained access to savings if the Bulow-
Rogoff assumption that the rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth is relaxed. Cole
and Kehoe (1995), Eaton (1996) and Kletzer and Wright (2000) stress that commitment
is two-sided, as lenders may not comply with the punishment required to maintain
discipline. Wright (2002) formalizes banks’ tacit collusion to punish a country in de-
fault. Cole and Kehoe (1998) argue that opportunistic behavior in the financial market
may tarnish the sovereign’s overall reputation and create a collateral loss in the rela-
tionship with third parties (e.g. domestic constituencies). Cole and Kehoe (2000) study
a country’s dynamic debt management in a DSGE reputation model.
On the empirical front, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show how the presence of trend
shocks improves the ability of Eaton-Gersovitz style models to account for actual rate
of defaults and other empirical facts for emerging markets. Second, while a number
of scholars have documented that defaulting countries recoup unexpectedly quickly
access to international capital markets, Cruces and Trebesch (2013) show that large
haircuts are associated with high subsequent bond yield spreads and long periods of
capital market exclusion.
These papers focus on the allocation of risk between the country and foreign credi-
tors. So does the work of Gennaioli et al (2014) and Mengus (2013 a,b), which stresses
the role of domestic banking exposures in the sovereign’s decision to default.6 Arteta
and Hale (2008), Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and Gennaioli et al (2014) provide em-
pirical evidence on the internal cost of default. Jeske (2006) and Wright (2006) analyze
the impact of the allocation of country liabilities between private and public borrowing.
The innovation in these papers is the introduction of resident default on international
borrowing (associated with a lack of enforcement of foreign claims on domestic resi-
and find that such sanctions were very effective in resuscitating access to capital markets after default.
6This holds even if the sovereign can engage in bailouts of domestic banks, provided that it has
incomplete information on the quality of balance sheets: see Mengus (2013 a,b). Models of moral hazard
(e.g., Tirole 2003) often stress the benefits of a home bias in savings on the government’s incentive to
behave.
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dents by domestic enforcement institutions), on top of standard default on public debt.
By contrast, this paper takes a shot at analyzing the equilibrium allocation of claims
on the sovereign between the private and official sectors as well as the split within the
official sector; to this purpose it introduces two features that are traditionally absent
in the literature: collateral damage costs and the possibility of cross-insurance among
countries.7
Corsetti et al (2006) develop a model of mixed private-public financing, in which
international institutions serve as a lender of last resort and prevent self-fulfilling liq-
uidity runs. They emphasize the role of the precision of the international institu-
tion’s information, and show that official lending may not increase moral hazard.
Persson and Tabellini (1996) study cross-country fiscal externalities when political in-
stitutions are not integrated but (a varying degree of) fiscal integration is in place.
Bolton and Jeanne (2011) show how monetary integration may create a premium on
a healthy country’s debt through the collateral demand by banks in weaker ones, and
that joint liability destroys this premium.
Bulow and Rogoff (1988) build an infinite-horizon framework of a recurrent debt
renegotiation among three players: the debtor country, creditor banks, and consumers
in creditor countries, who benefit from the debtor country’s exports and therefore are
willing to contribute in order to avoid the debtor country’s default and concomitant
trade sanctions. The anticipation of future side-payments by consumers implies that
bank lenders (the “market” in my model) are willing to lend more, which benefits the
borrowing country.
Niepmann and Eisenlohr (2013) consider private defaults rather than defaults on
sovereign debt. Spillovers are associated with cross exposures between banks of dif-
ferent countries. Contagion thus arises from international balance sheets. The paper
looks at the optimal bailout of banks (which requires using distortionary taxation),
and show that efficient risk sharing requires that the healthy country should finance a
larger fraction of the bailout of the distressed country’s banks than the distressed coun-
try does. This risk sharing arrangement however does not emerge from uncoordinated
behaviors.
This paper is complementary to these papers in its emphasis on optimal design,
debt limits, the emergence of joint liability, the role of contagion and the benefits from
market financing.
Finally, the paper offers some similarities with the literature on the “cross-pledging”
of the revenues in several activities by a single agent (Diamond, 1984) and among
7In the banking context, Rochet and Tirole (1996) derives optimal cross-exposures as the outcome of
a trade-off between the incentive to monitor and the risk of contagion.
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agents (literature on group lending and microfinance).8 It has been shown in the latter
literature that group lending can increase entrepreneurs’ access to capital either by mo-
bilizing social capital or by inducing mutual monitoring. Relative to this literature, the
paper adds bailouts (the group lending literature assumes that joint liability is the only
vector of solidarity) and the requirement that the exercise of even contractual solidarity
must respect the guarantor’s willingness or ability to pay constraint.
2 Asymmetric environment
(a) Description
There are two periods (t = 1, 2) and no discounting between the two periods. There
are three risk neutral economic agents: the borrowing country (A, the agent), which is
cashless at date 1, the international financial market/private investors (M), and an-
other country (P, the principal). The principal is affected by a default of the borrowing
country and has deep pockets (so, this is the asymmetric version of the model). The
private financial market is competitive.
A borrowing contract between the country and international investors (M or/and
P) specifies a reimbursement-contingent sanction c ∈ [0, C] on the country. C denotes
the maximal direct punishment that can be imposed upon the country. The sanction
c generates an “externality” or “collateral damage” indirect cost rc on the other coun-
try where r < 1 denotes the spillover-own default cost ratio. We conveniently take
spillovers costs to be proportional to own default costs, but the key property is that
tougher sanctions also create larger spillover costs.
We will also allow direct sanctions on the principal in case a pact involving the
principal is signed; for instance, joint liability may have to be enforced through direct
sanctions on the principal if the latter does not abide by its commitment: See Section
3. Were the principal to be sanctioned, we will then assume symmetrical spillover
(the same r coefficient) costs for the agent for notational simplicity, but none of our
qualitative results hinges on this assumption.
Each country’s objective is to maximize the expectation of total (date 1 + date 2) con-
sumption net of sanction costs. The timing, described as in Figure 1, goes as follows.
Date 1: Borrowing.
The only difference between “laissez-faire” and an “optimal pact” is that in the
latter case the agent contracts with the principal before borrowing from the market. In
8See, e.g., Tirole (2006, section 4.6) for a review of that literature’s main themes, as well as Tirole
(2010) for a recent contribution to the economics of extended liability.
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Pact
A demands
a lump-sum
transfer τ in
exchange of a
commitment
to a borrow-
ing contract
{b0 , c0(·)}.
P accepts or
rejects the
offer.
Laissez-faire
−→
Date 1
Borrowing
A publicly borrows b
from the market and
consumes Rb (or
R(b+ τ) in case of a
pact). The borrowing
contract specifies a
sanction c(d)
contingent on
reimbursement d
((b, c(·)) = (b0 , c0(·))
if P has accepted A’s
offer).
Ex post debt
assumption
A offers P to
transfer t(d)
contingent on debt
repayment d;
P accepts or
rejects the offer.
Income
realization
A’s income (y
or 0) is
realized and
observed by
A only.
Consumption
and sanctions
A chooses its
repayment
level d, leading
to sanctions
c(d).
A consumes
y − d− c(d)
(plus t(d) if the
date-2 offer is
accepted by
P ).
Date 2
Figure 1: Timing
the case of an ex-ante pact, we will see that there is no loss of generality involved in
assuming that the agent borrows only from the market and demands a payment τ in
exchange of a commitment to a given borrowing contract.
At date 1, the agent has no money, borrows b from the market and values this bor-
rowing at Rb. The parameter R measures the intensity of the agent’s liquidity needs:
current consumption needs or, in an extension of the model, quality of his investment
opportunities.9 A borrowing contract specifies a sanction c(d) ∈ [0, C] for each level of
debt repayment d. It is publicly observable.
A special case of a borrowing contract is a simple debt contract; in a simple debt
contract (which will turn out to be optimal), the borrowing contract specifies debt d
to be repaid at date 2 to private investors and a sanction c if and only if the debt d is
not fully repaid (for simplicity, we will abuse notation and denote by c and d a non-
contingent sanction and debt).
Date 2
9Rb is most simply interpreted as the agent’s date-1 consumption. When R stands for the value of
investment opportunities, one must be careful to distinguish investments in non-tradables (which are
private benefits and therefore akin to consumption) and investments in tradables (that are likely to raise
date-2 income available for repayment). The situation in which borrowing can serve to invest in trad-
ables rather than in non tradables or to consume can be formalized by assuming that the probability
of a high income is contingent on the amount of borrowing (α(b), with α increasing and concave), the
principal’s preferences with respect to agent borrowing can be shown to be ambiguous, even excluding
any bailout. On the one hand, the principal benefits from a higher level of borrowing because this in-
creases the probability α that the agent will be able to repay its debt; on the other hand, more borrowing
is associated with a higher debt reimbursement and, in an optimal contract, higher sanctions on the
country and therefore higher spillovers on the principal (this can be seen more formally by looking at
the optimal program for the agent: max {α(b)(y− d)− [1− α(b)]c} subject to c ≥ d and b ≤ α(b)d. The
expected externality on the principal is then {−[1− α(b)]rc}).
In practice, countries are mostly worried by over-borrowing by the countries that might inflict collat-
eral damage rather than by their under-borrowing; relatedly, the widespread concern is that indebted
countries borrow to consume or to invest in the non-tradable sector (e.g. real estate). Thus, our formu-
lation captures actual peer concerns about over-borrowing.
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Income realization.
At date 2, the agent receives a random income, equal to y with probability α (good
state of nature, G) and 0 with probability 1− α (bad state of nature, B). Only the agent
observes the realization. Income “0” is to be interpreted as some incompressible, mini-
mum level of consumption below which the agent is not disposed to go. Equivalently,
the market and the principal are uncertain as to whether A is willing to make sacrifices
to reimburse the debt (i.e., as to the level of the incompressible level of consumption).10
We assume for expositional convenience11 that C ≥ y, which means that one can
design sanctions that are strong enough to rule out strategic default.
Debt assumption/bailout.
A offers P a contract specifying a transfer t(d) conditional on A repaying d to in-
vestors (this stage actually matters only if no pact has been signed at date 1). P then
accepts or rejects this offer; t(d) = 0 for all d in case of rejection. (For example, in
the case of a simple debt contract with investors, one can restrict attention to offers in
which P brings conditional support t(d) = d− d̂, with d̂ ≤ d, provided that the agent
reimburses the private investors. The remaining debt burden on A is then d̂.)
Repayment decision.
Finally, the agent chooses repayment d, leading to sanction c(d). For the moment,
we assume commitment to the sanction. Later on (see Proposition 2), we will revisit
this commitment assumption and show that it is fine in the case of market financing,
but questionable in the case of official financing; we will then conclude that the country
must borrow from private investors to achieve commitment. Thus, we can proceed by
assuming commitment, as long as we keep this point in mind for the implementation
of the optimal pact.
(b) Discussion of modeling choices
Key ingredients. The key ingredients of the theory presented here are: a) borrowing
country sovereignty: the latter can borrow in the marketplace if it wants to; and b) exter-
nality: default imposes costs not only on the defaulting country, but also on the other
country. These ingredients ensure that rescues may occur and that the country’s bor-
rowing conditions depend on the possibility of solidarity by the deeper pocket country.
10Were the state of nature verifiable, then contingent debt contracts could be written, that deliver a
higher utility to the agent. The latter would then be tempted to renege in the good state of nature, as op-
timal insurance would call for debt forgiveness in the bad state and a high repayment in the good state.
See Grossman and van Huyck (1988) for the view that if states of nature are verifiable, the sovereign’s
ability to default partially or fully can, under some conditions, mimic an optimal state-contingent debt
contract. In practice, some of the state of nature may be observable and therefore some state-contingency
is to be expected. Furthermore, the government’s overall attitude may partly reveal the underlying state.
In this spirit, Trebesch (2009) finds that domestic firms suffer more in their access to credit when the gov-
ernment has employed coercive actions instead of good faith debt renegotiations.
11The case C < y delivers similar results, but is a bit more cumbersome.
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Non-essential modeling choices. In contrast with these essential modeling choices, we
could make a variety of alternative assumptions concerning less essential ones, leading
to quantitatively different, but qualitatively similar results. First, we could posit differ-
ent information structures for the principal and the market; indeed, in the first version
of the paper (Tirole 2012), the principal was assumed to observe the agent’s shock real-
ization and to collude with the agent regarding the announcement of this realization;
the principal is interestingly in a weaker position under symmetric information as it
knows exactly how much is required to prevent default; furthermore, the principal
then has an effective role as a lender beyond that of a bailout entity. On the other hand,
the version presented here is simpler because the principal has no comparative advan-
tage in lending (actually, we will show that it has a comparative disadvantage, due to
its lack of credibility as an enforcer of sanctions). Second, if debt repayment were a
more protracted event (the country could delay default by incurring sacrifices), a war
of attrition between the principal (delaying debt assumption) and the agent (delaying
default) could occur.12
Recouping through sanctions. We can think of sanction c as endowing the lenders
with the ability to ask a court to recoup country’s assets or seize its exports abroad,
or more generally to enforce sanctions on the country. We are studying optimal con-
tracts between the debtor country and its lenders. Note also that our model ignores the
amount collected by market investors when the country defaults. This is only for no-
tational simplicity; it is straightforward to add an investor payoff εc to default penalty
enforcement as long as it is smaller than the defaulting country’s cost due to this en-
forcement (0 < ε < 1); we here take the limit as ε tends to 0 to avoid carrying around
payment recovery terms.
Partial vs. full repayment. In the optimal borrowing contract of our two-outcome
framework (y or 0), the country will either honor the full liability or repay nothing.
In practice, countries rarely default fully and the cost of default seems to comprise a
fixed cost of not repaying in full, and a variable cost that increases with the actual size
of default. Such partial defaults and punishments do arise in the optimal contract of
our model with a continuum of outcomes, but the treatment is then more complex than
with two outcomes.
(c) No-externality benchmark: optimal borrowing contract with private investors
Suppose that there is no principal. Equivalently, as will be shown later, the principal
incurs no spillover cost (r = 0).
12Another informational case which could lead to a war of attrition occurs when the principal does
not observe the shock but the agent asks for the date-2 transfer after observing the shock.
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An incentive-compatible borrowing contract is a 4-uple {dG, dB, cG, cB} such that
cω ∈ [0, C] for ω ∈ {G, B}, dG ≤ y, dB = 0, and dG + cG ≤ dB + cB = cB. Using the
competitive capital market assumption (b = αdG), the country’s welfare is
UA = R[αdG] + α[y− dG − cG] + (1− α)(−cB).
At the optimum, cG = 0 (no sanction if the country reveals the high state) and dG = cB.
Thus the optimal contract is a simple debt contract, with a pre-specified debt repayment
demand d(= dG) ≤ y and sanction c = d (= cB) if d is not repaid in full. The agent
can borrow up to b = αc from the market, and reimburse d = c, the highest credible
reimbursement, in the good state, at the cost of default in the bad state. The agent then
receives utility
UA = R
(
αc
)
+ α
(
y− c)− (1− α)c.
Thus the agent solves
max
{c∈[0,y]}
{(αR− 1)c + αy}.
The agent can either refrain from borrowing (b = 0) and receive utility αy, or bor-
row maximally (b = αy) and receive utility (αR− 1)y+ αy (the linearity of the objective
function implies that we can focus on these two alternatives). Thus the agent borrows
from the market if13
αR > 1.
Proposition 1 (optimal borrowing contract in the absence of externality). Suppose that
r = 0. At the optimum, there is no borrowing if R < 1/α. If R > 1/α, the optimal borrowing
contract is a simple debt contract with nominal debt d = y and sanction c = y if repayment is
lower than y.
3 Solidarity in the asymmetric environment
We now introduce an externality rc on the principal for sanction c on the agent. Let
e ≡ ry.
13For expositional convenience, we ignore non-generic cases (such as αR = 1), for which there are
multiple optima.
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denote the externality when the sanction is equal to y. This is the externality incurred in
the absence of debt assumption by the principal in state B when the agent’s repayment
is at its maximal level in state G, enforced by the threat of sanction c = y.
3.1 Optimal pact
We suppose that prior to borrowing at date 1 the agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it con-
tractual offer to the principal. If the principal turns down the offer, the outcome is the
laissez-faire one. We let ULFP ≤ 0 denote the principal’s reduced-form utility under
laissez-faire, i.e., if there is no agreement on a pact at date 1 (we will study its determi-
nation in Section 3.2; note that the possibility of debt assumption by P may alter A’s
borrowing relative to the level given in Proposition 1). Thus the agent puts the princi-
pal at its reservation utility ULFP . While the theory is easily generalized to more even
distributions of bargaining power at date 1, giving no bargaining power to the princi-
pal is particularly interesting because it gives the best chance to joint-liability demands
by the agent.
We adopt a mechanism design approach. The principal can make a date-1 con-
tribution τ in exchange of having a say on the borrowing contract. The equilibrium
allocation is described by
X the date-1 disbursements b by the market and τ by the principal, such that b+ τ ≥ 0
(since the agent has no money at date 1);
X the equilibrium effective debt repayment dωA by the agent in state of nature ω ∈
{G, B};
X the net date-2 payment by the principal tω in state of nature ω ∈ {G, B};14
X the total punishments cˆωA and cˆωP for the agent and principal in state of nature ω ∈
{G, B}.
“Total punishments” refer to the cost borne by countries from own default and the
other country’s default. Recall that the sanction ci on country i inflicts an externality rci
on the other country, where the direct cost exceeds the indirect one (r < 1). We allow
for the possibility of sanctions on the two countries and so the total sanction inflicted
upon i is:
cˆωi ≡ cωi + rcωj
14The accounting convention is that tω goes to private investors (equivalently, it can go to the agent,
who can use it to pay investors back). tω > 0 in case of a bailout, and< 0 if the principal receives money.
Note also that this notation refers to the actual repayments and does not imply that state-contingent debt
can be issued.
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Let Ĉ ≡
{
(cˆA , cˆP)|∃(cA , cP) ∈ [0, C]2 such that cˆi = ci + rcj
}
denote the set of feasible
punishments. Let cˆ ≡ (1 + r)C denote the maximal overall cost that can be inflicted
upon a country.15
Because there is revelation only by the agent and the initial contract can be designed
so as to be bilaterally efficient, the recontracting possibility between A and P at date 2
as pictured in Figure 1 is irrelevant.16 We will see in Section 4 that this is no longer the
case when the two countries are exposed to shocks that they must disclose.
Let
R∗ ≡

1
α− (1− α)r if α > (1− α)r
+∞ otherwise.
Thus R∗ > 1/α for r > 0.
Proposition 2 (optimal pact in the asymmetric case). Except for the level of date-1 trans-
fer from P to A, the optimal pact between the agent and the principal is independent of the
principal’s utility ULFP under laissez-faire:
(i) For R < R∗, the agent commits not to borrow (b∗ = 0) and so there is no sanction on the
equilibrium path (cˆωi = 0 for all ω and i). The optimal pact can be implemented through a fixed
date-1 transfer τ = −ULFP in exchange of a commitment by the agent not to borrow at all.
(ii) For R > R∗, the agent pays back in the good state of nature the maximum(y) it can pay
in that state, resulting in borrowing ability αy; and the principal chips in e = ry in that state.
Consequently, direct and indirect sanctions are y and e in the bad (default) state. Formally:
b + τ = α(y + e), dGA = cˆ
B
A = y, cˆ
B
P = e and cˆ
G
i = 0 for i ∈ {A, P}.
(iii) There is no need for joint liability in the optimal pact, regardless of R. For R > R∗, the
optimal pact can be implemented without any ex-ante pact through a simple debt contract in
which the agent borrows from the market d = y + e and incurs sanction c = y in the absence
of full repayment, the principal then offering a bailout e contingent on d being repaid. [Alter-
natively, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a pact. For instance, the principal
can transfer τ = αe against the agent’s commitment of borrowing no more than y from the
market.]
(iv) If furthermore sanctions are enforced only if it is in the interest of the lender to enforce
them, market financing is required whenever borrowing is optimal.
To obtain intuition for parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition (which are proved in the
Appendix), suppose that the agent in equilibrium repays an amount d in the good
15The assumption of cost additivity is made only to avoid adding new notation and is not required
for the theory to carry through. For instance, a country incurring trade sanctions may be less affected
by trade sanctions on neighbouring countries than it would be if it did not face such sanctions itself
(sub-additivity); conversely, political or military weakness due to economic difficulties may generate
super-additive effects. I am agnostic as to which prevails.
16This will result from the contract described in Proposition 2 being collusion-proof.
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state of nature. The minimum sanction that makes this incentive compatible is c = d,
implying total cost αd + (1− α)d = d on the agent and (1− α)rd on the principal. The
net benefit for the agent is thus (Rα− 1)d and the net cost for the principal (1− α)rd.
If Rα− 1 < (1− α)rR, i.e. R < R∗, then d = 0 is optimal, as the principal is willing
to transfer (1− α)rd at date 1 to the agent, raising the latter’s utility by R(1− α)rd. By
contrast, if R ≥ R∗, the agent, who cannot commit to repay more than y in the good
state of nature, already obtains its maximum utility by borrowing to the hilt and so no
pact can raise this utility without hurting the principal.
The implementation of the optimal contract (part (iii) of the Proposition) is straight-
forward. Note that when R > R∗ and in the laissez-faire implementation, the principal
contributes at level e conditional on repayment of total debt d = y + e, implying total
cost for the principal associated with agent borrowing equal to αe + (1− α)rcˆBA = e.
And so joint liability is not required. Joint liability is not used either in the second
implementation.
To understand why the joint-liability option serves no purpose, note that the po-
tential benefit of joint liability is that the agent, who values date-1 resources at R, can
borrow more if investors can turn to the principal if the debt is not paid by the agent.
However the principal must be compensated for that sacrifice; it de facto becomes a
second lender. Because the principal has the same rate of time preference and the same
information as the market and thus has no comparative advantage in the lending ac-
tivity, there are no gains from trade in that direction.
Finally, let us show that market financing is required for R > R∗, i.e., whenever
there is borrowing and sanctions are to be time-consistent (part (iv) of the Proposi-
tion). We have noted so far that the principal has the same discount factor and the
same information as the market. The spillover effects however put the principal at a
comparative disadvantage in lending relative to the market. To see this, suppose that
there is no borrowing from the private sector (b = 0) and that the principal trans-
fers τ = α(y + e) at date 1 and threatens the agent with sanction cˆBA = y in case of
non-repayment of debt dGA = y. Then it cannot be an equilibrium for the agent to reim-
burse y in state G and nothing in state B; for, the principal then would not enforce the
sanction in the absence of reimbursement since P would then sanction itself and lose e.
By contrast, the market credibly sanctions the agent in case of non-repayment pro-
vided that there is an arbitrarily small amount of money to be recouped in the process
(recall that we took the limit as ε, and therefore the amount of money ε cBA to be re-
couped (for sanction cBA that is inflicted in the absence of repayment), tends to 0). More
generally, mixed financing with sanctions imposed by market investors and the offi-
cial sector in proportion of their relative stakes in the country is not desirable. The
optimum requires delegating all sanctions to the market and then is equivalent to pure
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market financing.
Discussion
(a) A number of recent policy proposals by economists, think-tanks and politicians17
have proposed introducing contractual solidarity through a two-tier borrowing struc-
ture: blue bonds, for which the Eurozone would be jointly liable, and red bonds, for
which no such solidarity would operate.18 Blue bond issues would be capped at a frac-
tion of GDP (say 60 %). These proposals all insist on a number of features: budgetary
supervision (a policy that in our model would be akin to controlling moral hazard on
the choice of α), joint liability on the blue bonds, no bail-out clause on the red bonds,
and seniority of blue bonds over red bonds. Our analysis shows that joint liability is
unlikely to emerge under asymmetric conditions.
(b) The optimality of full market borrowing is due to the fact that the model takes away
all comparative advantage from the principal: it has no informational advantage, and
on top of that it does not like to sanction a default because it will shoot itself in the
foot. If the principal could observe the borrower’s state more easily than the market,
then there may be a lending role especially in a repeated context, where the principal
can be incentivized to punish even if it is costly. Part (iv) of the Proposition therefore
should not be interpreted as a statement that the market always wins over the principal
(anticipating on our other applications of our model, think of informal lending by the
extended family versus lending by micro finance organizations). But the overall thrust
is that one needs the “outside market” for loans.
(c) A spread on the agent’s sovereign debt appears when the agent opts for a risky
strategy. Proposition 2 therefore implies that high spreads correlate with high liquidity
needs (high R). By contrast, because this model has no shortage of international stores
of value, the agent’s borrowing pattern has no impact on the principal’s borrowing
conditions: there is just no spread there. By contrast, if there were a shortage of safe
financial instruments in the principal’s economy, safe instruments’ premium would
17Variants of Eurobonds have been advocated by most leading European politicians, multi-lateral
organizations (e.g., the IMF), the media (e.g., The Economist), and in several economists’ proposals that
have attracted wide attention in policy circles. See in particular Delpla and von Weizsacker (2010),
Euro-nomics group (2011), and Hellwig and Philippon (2011). Related proposals include the European
Commission’s green paper on “stability bonds” (2011), the Tremonti-Juncker proposal (2010), and the
German Council of Economic Experts’ “European Redemption Pact” (2011). See Claessens et al (2012)
for an extensive overview and discussion of the various proposals.
Most of these proposals advocate coupling Eurobonds with borrowing limits. For example, Olivier
Blanchard, IMF’s chief economist, argues in the Financial Times Deutschland (April 23, 2012) that: “When
there was no fiscal treaty nor budgetary discipline instruments, the Germans had good reason to reject
bearing the brunt of irresponsible policies by other states. But now we have a fiscal treaty. The Germans
should accept that the Eurozone is going by way of Eurobonds.” The European Financial Stability
Facility created in 2010 can issue bonds backed by guarantees given by the Euro area member states.
18The particular terminology is due to Delpla and von Weizsacker (2010). See also the closely related
Eurobill proposal of Hellwig and Philippon (2011).
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increase due to a flight to quality, as in Bolton and Jeanne (2011). These properties will
also hold under laissez-faire.
3.2 Laissez-faire
While Proposition 2 contained the main insights for the asymmetric case and qualita-
tively does not depend on the exact value of the principal’s laissez-faire payoff ULFP ,
it is interesting to investigate the agent’s date-1 borrowing behavior when there are
externalities (r ≥ 0) but no pact has been signed at date 1. We restrict attention, in
this section only, to simple debt contracts (although we will prove in the Appendix that
such contracts can be optimal in the full class of feasible contracts).
Proposition 3 (optimal borrowing under laissez faire). In the absence of contract with
the principal, the agent always borrows from the market at date 1. The agent’s optimal simple
debt contract is
X either a high-debt policy (borrowing α(y + rc) against debt claim y + rc and defaulting in
the bad state), where c = y if Rαr < 1− α, and c = C if Rαr > 1− α.
X or a low-debt one (borrowing dL against debt claim dL and never defaulting, thanks to the
principal’s ex-post debt assumption). The safe debt level is dL ≡ (1− α)rC if rC < y, and
dL = rC if rC > y.
(i) The agent picks the high-debt policy if R ≥ RLF for some threshold RLF ≤ R∗ .
(ii) The high-debt policy is more likely, the greater the probability of a good state and the more
pressing the agent’s liquidity needs.
(iii) The principal’ s welfare ULFP is lowest when the agent’s liquidity needs are high.
This result sheds light on why P and A may gain from contracting before A re-
ceives financing from the market. When the agent’s liquidity needs are not pressing
(R < RLF), the principal knows that borrowing will be limited under laissez-faire;
as there is then no default, there are no gains from contracting between the princi-
pal and the agent at date 1, and laissez-faire prevails. As liquidity needs increase
(RLF < R < R∗), the agent, who would over-borrow under laissez-faire, is offered a
“bribe” by the principal to limit its borrowing.19 When R starts exceeding R∗, though,
risky borrowing becomes jointly efficient. The parties cannot improve on laissez-faire
then. It is only when the agent’s high borrowing is inefficient, which occurs for inter-
mediate values of R, that the principal and the agent gain from a pact.
19A control over private borrowing is in general required. Otherwise, the agent might well over-
borrow, preventing the optimum from being reached. This argument is a variant of the classic dilution
problem (e.g., Bizer-de Marzo, 1992; Segal 1999), but with a twist: Overborrowing is here motivated by
the desire to trigger an uncontracted-for bailout.
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Intuition.The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in the Appendix. To grasp the intu-
ition for it, consider a simple debt contract when the maximal sanction, C, is exactly
equal to y. Either the agent borrows dH = y + e (where, recall, e = ry) and then re-
ceives conditional support e and pays back y in the good state. The agent then defaults
in the bad state. This yields principal welfare UP(dH) = −e and gross agent welfare:
UA(dH) = Rα(y + e)− (1− α)y.
Or the agent borrows dL = (1− α)e which the principal covers rather than risking an
agent default and concomitant spillover cost e with probability 1− α, and so no default
occurs. Then principal welfare is UP(dH) = −(1− α)e and gross agent welfare is
UA(dL) = R(1− α)e + αy.
Note that:
UA(dH) ≥ UA(dL) ⇐⇒ R ≥ RLF = 1/[α+ (2α− 1)r]
where RLF < R∗ (whenever RLF is finite; if (1− 2α)r ≥ α, then RLF = R∗ = +∞).
Finally, note that for r = 0 (the no-externality or no-principal case), RLF = R∗ =
1/α.
4 Contractual solidarity behind the veil of ignorance
Consider now the symmetric version of the two-country model. Both countries bor-
row at date 1. Country i ∈ {1, 2} values cash bi available at date 1 at Rbi. At date 2,
each country either has income y (is “intact” or “healthy”) or has no income (is “dis-
tressed”). Only the country knows its income realization. The state of nature is now
ω = (ω1 ,ω2) where ωi ∈ {G, B} . The probability that k countries have income y is pk
(with Σ2k=0 pk = 1). By keeping these probabilities general, we allow arbitrary patterns
of correlation between income shocks. Let
α ≡ p2 + (p1/2)
denote the unconditional probability of being intact, and
β ≡ p2/[p2 + (p1/2)]
the probability of the other country being healthy when the country itself is healthy.
Positive (resp. negative) correlation corresponds to β > α or 4p2p0 > p21 (resp. β < α
or 4p2p0 < p21).
18
For comparative statics purposes, we will occasionally define an index ρ of corre-
lation. Suppose that the incomes are perfectly positively correlated with probability
ρ (they are both equal to y or to 0), and perfectly negatively correlated with probabil-
ity 1− ρ (one is equal to y and the other to 0, with equal probabilities), the marginal
probability of y remaining equal to α. Then
p2 = α [1− (1− ρ)(1− α)] , p1 = 2α(1− α)(1− ρ) and p0 = (1− α) [1− (1− ρ)α] .
Perfect positive (negative) correlation corresponds to ρ = 1 (ρ = 0). More generally,
we will say that the countries are more correlated if ρ increases.
The (symmetric) laissez-faire outcome does not influence even quantitatively the
optimal (symmetric) contract, and so need not be derived. Let us investigate the con-
ditions under which joint liability, which creates a risk of domino effect and thereby
increases default costs if the amount of borrowing is high, emerges from an optimal
pact. We again distinguish between country i’s own sanction cost, ci, and the (smaller)
collateral damage this sanction imposes on the other country, rci (where r < 1). With-
out loss of generality, we focus on incentive compatible (truthful) mechanisms.
Let cˆ0 (respectively cˆ2) denote the total sanction cost per country when both are in
distress (respectively, healthy). When k = 1, we will distinguish between the pain, cˆG1 ,
inflicted upon the country that is in a good state (has income y), and that, cˆB1 , inflicted
upon the country in a bad state (with zero income). Let cˆ1 ≡
(
cˆB1 + cˆ
G
1
)
/2 denote the
per-country average pain when k = 1. And let dk denote the expected, per-country
reimbursement to private creditors in state of nature k. Obviously, d0 = 0. Similarly,
when k = 1, the healthy country pays 2d1.
As often in mechanism design, the strategy for finding the optimal arrangement
will consist in considering a subconstrained program and checking that its solution
can indeed be implemented. Consider the following program:
max
{
R
[
Σ2k=0pkdk
]
− Σ2k=0pk
(
dk + cˆk
)}
(II)
= max
{
(R− 1)(p2d2 + p1d1)−
[
p2cˆ2 + p1
cˆG1 + cˆ
B
1
2
+ p0cˆ0
]}
subject to the truthtelling constraint in the good state
β
(
d2 + cˆ2
)
+ (1− β)(2d1 + cˆG1 ) ≤ βcˆB1 + (1− β)cˆ0
and to feasibility constraints
d2 ≤ y
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and
2d1 ≤ y
The objective function is the difference between a country’s date-1 benefit derived
from borrowing b = Σ2k=0pkdk, and the date-2 cost, which includes monetary reim-
bursement and the pain associated with sanctions and their spillovers. The per-country
expected payoff is equal to αy (a constant) plus the maximand in (II), which represents
the net per-country utility.
In the absence of further constraints, the full information allocation would be fea-
sible when the countries are perfectly positively correlated (p1 = 0 ⇐⇒ β = 1).20
Having each country reimburse y when healthy and 0 when distressed, and no default
on the equilibrium path, can be obtained by setting cˆ2 = cˆ0 = 0, d2 = 2d1 = y, and
cˆB1 = y. This discussion provides a first rationale for the following condition:
Collusion-proofness. The overall contract is collusion-proof if the countries cannot
profitably increase their welfares through a side contract written before the state of
nature is revealed. Formally, a side contract is a revelation game between the two
parties in which both countries announce their own state of nature ωi ∈ {G, B} in
an incentive-compatible way to a mediator prior to their public announcements. The
side contract specifies public announcements ωˆ(ω) as well as side transfers from i to
j, tij(ω), such that tij(ω) + tji(ω) = 0. For more on the modeling of side contracting
used here, see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000).
The second rationale for the collusion-proofness requirement is that its introduction
makes the framework consistent with that of Sections 2 and 3 and its date-2 side con-
tract between A and P. Note further that any collusion that would occur after the agent
learns the income realization can be achieved before he learns it (technically, there are
fewer individual rationality constraints in the collusion subform).
We consider a subset of the constraints imposed by collusion proofness, leaving it
to the proposed implementation to check overall collusion proofness. Consider state
(G, G). If d2 + cˆ2 > cˆ0, the two countries could declare themselves income-free and be
better off. We thus require that
d2 + cˆ2 ≤ cˆ0.
Similarly it must not be the case that in state (G, G), the two parties gain from
randomizing between declaring (G, B) and declaring (B, G):
d2 + cˆ2 ≤ d1 +
cˆG1 + cˆ
B
1
2
20This point is closely related to that in Cre´mer and Mclean (1988), although there are a number of
differences, including the limited liability enjoyed by the agents.
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To see that such collusion does not interfere with truth-telling to the mediator of
the side contract, consider a side contract in which the countries misreport when the
state of nature is (G, G). This change only facilitates the fulfillment of the truth-telling
constraint.21 These two constraints do not exhaust the set of collusion-proofness con-
straints, but in the Appendix we verify that the derived contracts satisfy the missing
constraints.
A rapid inspection of this program shows that at the optimum cˆ2 = 0 and cˆG1 ≡
φ
(
cˆB1
)
: to reward truth telling, one punishes countries as little as possible when they
declare a high ability/willingness to pay.
Rewriting the program then yields:
max{
d2≥0, d1≥0,
(
cˆ0 , cˆB1
)
∈
[
0,cˆ
]2}{(R− 1)(p2d2 + p1d1)− [p1 φ(cˆB1 ) + cˆB12 + p0cˆ0]} (II)
s.t.
p2d2 + p1d1 +
p1
2
φ(cˆB1 ) ≤ p2cˆB1 +
p1
2
cˆ0 (1)
d2 ≤ y (2)
2d1 ≤ y (3)
d2 ≤ cˆ0 (4)
d2 ≤ d1 + φ(cˆ
B
1 ) + cˆ
B
1
2
(5)
Feasible contacts, i.e. contracts satisfying (1) through (5), include two prominent
classes (as we will later show, optimal allocations can often be implemented by a con-
tract in these classes):
Individual liability contracts (IL). An individual debt contract is characterized by
d2 = y , d1 = y/2 , d0 = 0
and
cˆ2 = 0 , cˆB1 = y , cˆ
G
1 = ry , cˆ0 = (1+ r)y,
21Letting Uωiωj denote the expected utility of party i in state ωi when the other party is in state ωj, the
truth telling constraint can be rewritten as:
βUGG + (1− β)UGB ≥ βUBG + (1− β)UBB + y.
This constraint is still satisfied when UGG is replaced by some ÛGG ≥ UGG. Furthermore, the truthtelling
constraint when ωi = B is not affected because a distressed country cannot mimic a healthy one if there
is any borrowing (p2d2 + p1d1 > 0).
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delivering utility
UIL ≡
[
(R− 1)α− (1− α)(1+ r)
]
y.
Note that constraints (4) and (5) are slack in the IL contract, which is also shown in the
Appendix to satisfy the ignored collusion-proofness; so individual contracts do not
invite collusion. The borrowing constraint level is
bIL ≡ (p2 + p12 )y = αy.
Joint liability contracts (JL). A contract with joint liability is characterized by
d2 = d1 = y/2 , d0 = 0
and
cˆB1 = cˆ
G
1 = 0 , cˆ0 =
( p2 + p1
p1
)
y,
where the value of cˆ0 is the minimal sanction when k = 0 that guarantees individual
truthtelling.
Note that, unlike individual debt contracts, joint liability contracts are not always
feasible as they require sufficient sanctions:
cˆ ≡ (1+ r)C ≥
( p2 + p1
p1
)
y.
JL contracts then deliver utility
UJL ≡
[
(R− 1) (1− p0)
2
− p0
( p2 + p1
p1
)]
y.
Note that constraints (2) and (4) are slack in the JL contract. The Appendix checks that
the JL contract satisfies the missing collusion-proofness constraints and not only (4)
and (5); it is therefore collusion-proof. The borrowing level is
bJL ≡ (p2 + p1)y/2 < bIL,
provided that p2 > 0.
We first compare these two classes of contracts:
UIL ≥ UJL ⇐⇒ R− 1
2
≥ (1+ r)
( p1 + 2p0
2p2
)
−
p0
(
p2 + p1
)
p2p1
.
Note that either can dominate: For instance, individual liability dominates for R
22
large, while for p2 = p0 (i.e. α = 1/2), the RHS of this inequality, equal to (1+ r)[1+
(p1/2p2)] − [1 + p2/p1], goes to +∞ as p2 goes to 0 (ρ → 1) and so joint liability
dominates.
Proposition 4 (individual vs. joint liability). There is more borrowing under individual
liability: bIL > bJL (unless p2 = 0). Individual liability contracts are more attractive relative
to joint liability contracts (UIL −UJL increases),
(i) the higher the liquidity needs (R),
(ii) the higher the correlation (ρ) ,
(iii) the more limited the feasible sanctions (the lower C is),
(iv) the smaller the spillovers (the lower r is).
The proof of Proposition 4 is straightforward, so we will focus on the intuition.
There are costs and benefits to joint liability. The requirement of debt assumption
combined with limited resources imply lower debt levels, which is costly if liquid-
ity needs are high. On the other hand, joint liability reduces sanction costs in the state
in which only one of the countries is healthy; so joint liability is more attractive if this
event is likely.22 Third, we have seen that joint liability requires sufficient sanctions
(C ≥ (p2 + p1)y/p1(1 + r)) while individual liability does not. Finally, joint liabil-
ity becomes more attractive under high spillovers for two reasons; first, spillovers in-
crease the scope for sanctions (cˆ = (1+ r)C); second, the country’s welfare, UIL, under
independent liability decreases with spillovers while that, UJL, under joint liability is
independent of spillovers.
We now study whether IL or JL contracts are optimal contracts. To this purpose,
let us define the following notion:
A contract is a quasi-IL contract if
(i) d2 = 2d1 = y (maximum reimbursement)
(ii) cˆG1 = rcˆ
B
1 and constraints (1), (4) and (5) are satisfied.
So a quasi-IL contract involves maximum borrowing/reimbursement; it is a bit
more flexible in the allocation of sanctions
(
cˆ0 , cˆB1
)
to achieve truthtelling (constraint
(1)). The flexibility however is rather limited by the requirements that y ≤ cˆ0 and
y ≤ cˆB1 (1+ r) (constraints (4) and (5)).
Proposition 5 below provides a partial characterization of the optimum, comforting
the findings in Proposition 4.
22For example, for r = 0, individual liability strictly dominates in case of independence or positive
correlation.
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Proposition 5 (optimal contract). Let
A ≡ (R− 1) p1
2
− p0 and B ≡ (R− 1)
(
p2 − p1r2
)
− p1
(1+ r
2
)
.
(i) If A < 0 and B < 0, borrowing is suboptimal (b∗ = 0).
(ii) If A > 0 and B > 0, the optimal contract is a quasi-IL contract.
If p0p2 − p
2
1
4
=
p1
2
r
(
p0 +
p1
2
)
(as is the case for independence and no externality), the
IL contract is optimal.
(iii) If A > 0 > B , the optimal contract is the JL contract (provided that it is feasible, i.e.,
that cˆ ≥ [(p2 + p1)/p1]y).
Joint liability is therefore optimal when externalities (r) are large and correlation (ρ) low.
We conclude that for a wide range of parameters,23 either the joint-liability contract
or (a contract very similar to) the individual liability contract is optimal. The com-
parative statics on the factors favouring one or the other furthermore confirm those of
Proposition 4.
Interestingly, at the optimal contract, joint liability does not generate domino ef-
fects; this does not imply that the threat of contagion under joint liability plays no
role; indeed, this very threat of contagion is what leads the countries to moderate their
borrowing relative to what they borrow in the absence of joint liability.
5 Conclusion
Summary. Solidarity is driven by the fear that spillovers from the distressed country’s
default negatively affect the rescuer. This paper’s first contribution was to provide
formal content to the intuitive notion that collateral damages of a country’s default are
de facto collateral for the country.
The paper’s second contribution was to unveil the conditions under which joint-
and-several liability may emerge. Standard liquidity provision or risk sharing models
presume that accord is reached behind the veil of ignorance. Once the veil of ignorance
is lifted (as is currently the case in the Eurozone), healthy countries have no incentive to
accept obligations beyond the implicit ones that arise from spillover externalities. Put
differently, it is not in the self-interest of healthy countries to accept joint-and-several
liability, even though they realize that they will be hurt by a default and thus will
23When A < 0 < B, the solution to this program violates the missing collusion-proofness constraints,
and the analysis is then more complex.
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ex post show some solidarity in order to prevent spillovers. In this “non-transferable
utility” environment, gains from trade exist as total surplus can be increased, but they
cannot be realized. An ex-ante transfer from distressed countries to healthy ones to
compensate them for, and make them accept the future liability is ruled out as it would
just add to the distressed countries’ indebtedness.
Third, the paper showed that by contrast, in a more symmetrical, mutual-insurance
context, contractual solidarity in the form of joint liability is optimal provided that
country shocks are sufficiently independent, spillovers costs sufficiently large, liquid-
ity needs moderate and feasible sanctions sufficient. While domino effects do not arise
in equilibrium, the contagion risk leads to a reduction in borrowing relative to its max-
imal level under individual borrowing.
While joint liability has the potential to increase borrowing relative to individual
liability, the overall picture that emerges from the analysis is that the option of declar-
ing joint liability actually does not lead to higher borrowing levels: Either the potential
guarantor has deep pockets and then it has no incentive to enter joint liability because
it cannot be compensated for the service it provides to the other country. Or the two
parties have shallow pockets and then to avoid domino effects they keep their borrow-
ing limited when opting for joint liability.24 Finally, we have seen that spillovers confer
an advantage on market borrowing as they make sanctions by the official sector less
credible than market-imposed sanctions.
Returning to the puzzle stated in the introduction, both the bailout contributions
and the policy debate about Eurobonds and the banking union mostly concern a very
limited insurance pool, namely the Eurozone, while basic principles of insurance eco-
nomics would call for a much broader solidarity area. Although the following sug-
gestions are no substitute for a careful analysis, the model arguably sheds light on the
puzzle. First, the monetary union has drastically increased the degree of financial inte-
gration among Eurozone countries.25 Financial integration implies increased spillovers
from default. Second, the establishment of the monetary union in large part was driven
by a political project. Abandoning the Euro, or letting some Eurozone countries default
would have a substantial symbolic impact. These two factors are likely explanations
for the otherwise peculiar risk-sharing arrangement.
Research alleys. On the theoretical front, the paper is only a first attempt at under-
24As one referee pointed out, it would be interesting to study dynamic environments in which coun-
tries would be exposed to liquidity shocks rather than to solvency/pledgeable income shocks. For
example, in a three-period model, one of the countries might have a high R at the intermediate date. Its
ability to borrow under joint liability/ harness the other country’s pledgeable income would allow it to
borrow more in order to meet this liquidity shock.
25Until the recent “re-nationalization”. Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2010) shows that financial integration
was driven more by the elimination of currency risk than by trade in goods.
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standing the fundamentals of country solidarity, whether reluctantly provided or more
pro-actively contracted for. There are many interesting alleys for future research in
this area alone. For instance, one might extend the analysis of Section 4 to consider
extended solidarity; first losses could be covered by an inner circle of countries within
a solidarity area and macro shocks within this area might be partly insured by an outer
solidarity area (rest of the world, IMF).
Another fascinating topic for future analysis would result from asymmetries of in-
formation about collateral damages and the concomitant posturing behaviors in the
international community. Yet another class of extensions consists in studying repeated
bailouts.26
Similarly, one may build on this paper to investigate the impact of fiscal unions. A
fiscal union creates an automatic risk sharing mechanism and thus correlates income
realizations; it further generates some joint liability through the issuance of federal
debt. And, as is well-known, the increase in correlation facilitates the conduct of mon-
etary policy as well. Nonetheless, states still enjoy some degree of subsidiarity; the
implications of fiscal federalism for solidarity are definitely worth investigating.
The paper has assumed that troubled countries can resort only to hard default to
escape the burden of liabilities in adverse times. Either they are highly inflation averse
or their commitment to a currency union precludes any debt monetization. Broadening
the analysis to allow for debt monetization would be worthwhile.27
Another extension of this paper’s framework consists in endogenizing spillovers.
While empathy suffering and trade and political disruptions are in part exogenous,
counterparty risk is determined by domestic prudential supervision as well as other
mechanisms (such as the ECB’s recent LTRO facility that led to some “running for
home”). This paper’s previous version accordingly endogenized spillovers. Under
one-way insurance, the principal generally, although not always, chooses to minimize
its exposure to the risky country. By contrast, mutual insurance often leads countries
to contractually maximize their cross-exposures.
Finally, the paper’s modeling and implications focused on its international finance
motivation. Its potential scope of applications however is broader. A corporation may
guarantee a key supplier’s debts by integrating it as its division, or by keeping it in-
dependent and promising to cover its liabilities. Banks may enter various kinds of
contractual agreements, including credit lines, which imply varying degrees of soli-
26de Soyres (2013) derives the choice of the maturity structure of a sovereign that may be repeatedly
bailed out. She finds that long-term debt arises for moderate liquidity needs. By contrast, short-term
debt is more likely to be raised in situations of high liquidity needs. She then shows that the rescuer may
assume short-term debt in order to avoid an impending default but will rather target long-term debt if
the country does not want to repay because its total debt is too large.
27Recent work on debt monetization includes Aguiar et al (2013) and Corsetti and Dedola (2012).
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darity. Individuals choose between giving a helping hand to members of their fam-
ily (children) or friends facing financial straits and more formally standing surety for
them, thereby facilitating their access to credit or housing. Integrating the specificities
of these other contexts would be of much interest.
These and the many related topics on solidarity are left to future research.
27
References
Aguiar, Mark., and Gita Gopinath. 2006. “Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Cur-
rent Account.” Journal of International Economics. 69: 64–83.
Aguiar Mark, Manuel Amador, Emmanuel Farhi and Gita Gopinath. 2013. “Crisis and
Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises,”
mimeo.
Arteta, Carlos, and Galina Hale. 2008. “Sovereign Debt Crises and Credit to the Private
Sector,” Journal of International Economics. 74: 53–69.
Bester, Helmut. 1987. “The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Infor-
mation.” European Economic Review. 3: 887–899.
Bizer, David, and Peter M. de Marzo. 1992. “Sequential Banking.” Journal of Political
Economy, 100: 41–61.
Bolton, Patrick, and Olivier Jeanne. 2009. “Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign
Debt: The Role of Seniority.” Review of Economic Studies. 76(3): 879–902.
Bolton, Patrick, and Olivier Jeanne. 2011. “Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility
in Financially Integrated Economies.” IMF Economic Review. 59(2): 162–194.
Bolton, Patrick, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. “The Political Economy of Debt Morato-
ria, Bailouts and Bankruptcy.” in Defusing Default, ed. Marco Pagano, 77–115. Wash-
ington DC: IDB Publication.
Bolton, Patrick, and Howard Rosenthal. 2002. “Political Intervention in Debt Con-
tracts.” Journal of Political Economy; 110(5): 1103–34.
Borensztein, Eduardo, and Ugo Panizza. 2009. “The Costs of Sovereign Default.” IMF
Staff Papers, 56: 683–741.
Broner, Fernando, Alberto Martin, and Jaume Ventura. 2010. “Sovereign Risk and Sec-
ondary Markets.” American Economic Review, 100: 1523–55.
Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1988. “Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling
Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining Theoretic Framework.” IMF Staff Papers,
35. Reprinted in Analytical Issues in Debt, eds J. Frenkel, M. Dooley, and P. Wickham,
(IMF, Washington D.C. 1989).
Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1989a. “A Constant Recontracting Model of
Sovereign Debt.” Journal of Political Economy, 97(1): 155–178.
Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1989b. “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?,”
American Economic Review, 79(1): 43–50.
Calvo, Guillermo. 1988. “Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations.” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 78(4): 647–661.
Claessens, Stijn, Ashoka Mody, and Shahin Vallee. 2012. “Paths to Eurobonds,”
IMF Working Paper 12/172. http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/733-paths-to-eurobonds
Cole, Harold L., and Patrick J. Kehoe. 1995. “ The Role of Institutions in Reputation
Models of Sovereign Debt.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 35(1): 45–64.
Cole, Harold L., and Patrick J. Kehoe. 1998. “Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial vs.
General Reputations.” International Economic Review, 39(1): 55–70.
28
Cole, Harold L., and Timothy J. Kehoe. 2000. “Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises.” Review of
Economic Studies, 67(1): 91–116.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Luca Dedola. 2012. “The Mystery of the Printing Press: Self-
fulfilling Debt Crises, and Monetary Sovereignty,” CEPR DP 9358.
Corsetti, Giancarlo., Bernardo Guimaraes, and Nouriel Roubini. 2006. “International
Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF’s Catalytic Finance.”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(3): 441-471.
Cre´mer, Jacques, and Richard Mclean. 1988. “Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian
and Dominant Strategy Auctions,” Econometrica, 56(6): 1247–1257.
Cruces, Juan J., and Christoph Trebesch. 2013. “Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Hair-
cuts.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(3): 85–117.
de Soyres, Constance (2013) “The Maturity Structure of Sovereign Debts within a Soli-
darity Zone,” mimeo, TSE.
Dellas, Harris. , and Dirk F. Niepelt. 2013. “Credibility For Sale.” Mimeo, University
of Bern and Gerzensee. http:\\www.szgerzensee.ch/fileadmin/Dateien_
Anwender/Dokumente/working_papers/wp-1305.pdf
Delpla, Jacques, and Jakob von Weizsacker. 2010. “The Blue Bond Proposal.” Bruegel
Policy Brief 3: 1-8.
http:\\www.bruegel.org/download/parent/403-the-blue-bond-proposal/
file/885-the-blue-bond-proposal-english/
Diamond, Douglas W. 1984. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.”
Review of Economic Studies, 51(3): 393–414.
Eaton, Jonathan. 1996. “Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms.” International
Journal of Finance and Economics, 1: 25–36.
Eaton, Jonathan J., and Mark Gersovitz. 1981. “Debt with Potential Repudiation: The-
oretical and Empirical Analysis,”Review of Economic Studies 48(2): 289–309.
Eaton, Jonathan J., Mark Gersovitz, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1986. “The Pure Theory of
Country Risk.” European Economic Review, 30: 481–513.
Euro-nomics Group (Brunnermeier, Markus, Luis Garicano, Philip R. Lane, Marco
Pagano, Ricardo Reis, Tano Santos, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, and Dimitri
Vayanos). 2011. “ESBies: A Realistic Reform of Europe’s Financial Archi-
tecture.” VoxEU.org, 25 October. http://www.voxeu.org/article/esbies-realistic-
reform-europes-financial-architecture
Farhi, Emmanuel, and Jean Tirole. 2012. “Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch
and Systemic Bailouts.” American Economic Review, 102(1): 60–93.
Fernandez, Raquel, and Robert W Rosenthal. 1990. “Strategic Models of Sovereign-
Debt Renegotiations.” Review of Economic Studies, 57(3): 331–349.
Gennaioli, Nicola., Alberto Martin, and Stefano Rossi. 2014. “Sovereign Default, Do-
mestic Banks and Financial Institutions.” Journal of Finance, 69(2): 819–866.
Grossman, Herschel, and John Van Huyck. 1988. “Sovereign Debt as a Contingent
Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation.” American Economic Review,
78(5): 1088–1097.
Hellwig, Christian, and Guido Lorenzoni. 2009. “Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt.”
Econometrica, 77: 1137–1164.
29
Hellwig, Christian, and Thomas Philippon. 2011. “Eurobills, not Eurobonds.”
VoxEU.org, December 2, 2011. http://www.voxeu.org/article/eurobills-not-euro-
bonds
Jeske, Karsten. 2006. “Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation.” Journal of
Political Economy, 114 (3): 576–93.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem., Elias Papaionnou, and Jose-Luis Peydro. 2010. “What Lies
Beneath the Euro’s Effect on Financial Integration? Currency Risk, Legal Harmo-
nization, or trade?” Journal of International Economics, 81: 75–88.
Kletzer. 1984. “Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk,”
The Economic Journal, 94: 287–307.
Kletzer, Kenneth, and Brian Wright. 2000. “Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter.”
American Economic Review, 90: 621–639.
Krugman, Paul. 1985. “International Debt Strategies in an Uncertain World.” in Interna-
tional Debt and the Developing Countries, eds M. A. Smith, and A. Cuddington, 79–100.
Washington DC: The World Bank.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort. 1997. “Collusion under Asymmetric In-
formation,” Econometrica, 65(4): 875–911.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort. 2000. “Mechanism Design with Collusion
and Correlation,” Econometrica, 68(2): 309–342.
Mengus, Eric. 2013a. “Honoring Sovereign Debt or Bailing out Domestic Residents? A
Theory of Internal Costs of Default,” mimeo, TSE and HEC.
Mengus, Eric. 2013b. “International Bailouts, Why Did Banks Collective Bet Lead Eu-
rope to Rescue Greece,” mimeo, TSE and HEC.
Mitchener, Kris J., and Marc Weidenmier. 2010. “Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt
Repayment.” Journal of International Money and Finance, 29: 19–36.
Niepmann, Friederike, and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr. 2013. “Bank Bail-outs, Interna-
tional Linkages and Cooperation,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(4):
270–305.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of International Macroeco-
nomics. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1996. “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Shar-
ing and Moral Hazard.” Econometrica, 64(3): 623–646.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. 1996. “Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk.”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28: 733–762.
Rose, Andrew. 2005. “One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and Inter-
national Trade.” Journal of Development Economics, 77(1): 189–206.
Roubini, Nouriel. 2004. “Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Resolution and Mecha-
nisms for Dealing with Sovereign Debt Problems.” in Fixing Financial Crises in the
Twenty-First Century, ed. Andrew Haldane. 101–42. London: Routledge.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 1984. “Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing.” Princeton studies
in international finance, International Finance Section, Dept. of Economics, Princeton
University, 46 pages.
Segal, Ilya R. 1999. “Contracting with Externalities.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
114(2): 337–388
30
Sturzenegger, Federico, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2007. Debt Defaults and Lessons from
a Decade of Crises. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tirole, Jean. 2003. “Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual-and Common-Agency Per-
spective.” American Economic Review, 93(5): 1678–1702.
Tirole, Jean. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tirole, Jean. 2010. “From Pigou to Extended Liability: On the Optimal Taxation of Ex-
ternalities Under Imperfect Capital Markets,” Review of Economic Studies, 77: 697–729.
Tirole, Jean 2012. “Country Solidarity, Private Sector Involvement and the Contagion
of Sovereign Crises,” mimeo, TSE.
Trebesch, Christoph. 2009. “The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies: How
Much is the Private Sector Affected?” IMF Working Paper 09/29.
Weinschelbaum, Federico, and Jose´ Wynne . 2005. “Renegotiation, Collective Action
Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets.” Journal of International Economics, 67: 47–72.
Wright, Mark L.J. 2002. “Reputations and Sovereign Debt.” Stanford University
manuscript. http://sciie.ucsc.edu/conference/2002/wrightpaper.pdf
Wright, Mark L.J. 2006. “Private Capital Flows, Capital Controls and Default Risk.”
Journal of International Economics, 69(1): 120–49.
31
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the following program, consisting in maximizing the agent’s utility sub-
ject to incentive and participation constraints:
max
{
UA = R(b + τ) + α(y− dGA − cˆGA) + (1− α)(−cˆBA)
}
, (I)
subject to cˆω ∈ Cˆ for all ω, to the principal’s and the market’s participation constraints:
− τ − α
(
tG + cˆGP
)
− (1− α)
(
tB + cˆBP
)
≥ ULFP
− b + α
(
dGA + t
G
)
+ (1− α)tB ≥ 0,
and to feasibility and incentive compatibility:
dGA ≤ y and dGA + cˆGA ≤ cˆBA.
Adding up the participation constraints and replacing in UA yields
UA ≤ R[α
(
dGA − cˆGP ) + (1− α)
(
− cˆBP
)
−ULFP ] + α
(
y− dGA − cˆGA
)
+ (1− α)
(
− cˆBA
)
.
So let us maximize the RHS of this inequality subject to (cˆωA , c
ω
A) ∈ Ĉ for all ω and
to the agent’s feasibility and incentive constraints. A quick inspection of the program
shows that they should be no punishment in the good state of nature (cˆGA = cˆ
G
P = 0,
which is feasible), that punishment should not exceed what is necessary for incentive
compatibility: dGA = cˆ
B
A, and that the principal should be minimally punished in the
bad state: cˆBP = φ(cˆ
B
A) where
φ(cˆA) ≡ min
{(c˜A , c˜P)∈Ĉ|c˜A=cˆA}
{cˆP}.
Note that φ′ = r for cˆA < C (and φ′ = 1/r for C < cˆA < (1 + r)C, but this range is
irrelevant as cˆBA = d
G
A ≤ y ≤ C).
Substituting, the upper bound ÛA is reached by solving the new program:
ÛA = max{cˆBA≤y}
{
R
[
αcˆBA − (1− α)φ(cˆBA)−ULFP
]
+ αy− cˆBA
}
.
Note that
∂ÛA
∂cˆBA
= R[α− (1− α)φ′]− 1
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In the relevant range (cˆBA ≤ y ≤ C), then
∂ÛA
∂cˆBA
= R[α− (1− α)r]− 1,
which yields parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a simple debt contract, with reimbursement d > 0 and sanction c > 0 if
d is not fully reimbursed. Suppose first that, at date 2, A and P agree on contingent
transfers (tB, tG) such that there is no default in either state: tB ≥ d and so tB− d > −c.
Furthermore, tG ≥ tB (otherwise tB − d > max {tG − d,−c}). Thus, if the outcome is
no default at all, the expected cost to P is at least d. On the other hand, P’s utility is
bounded below by −rC. We are thus led to consider two cases:
(i) if C > y/r, the highest debt that the principal may assume in both states is d =
rC > y, enforced by sanction c = C. Indeed, for d = rC, the spillover cost is d = rC in
each state in which P does not bring support. A can thus offer P to transfer tG = tB = d;
the principal exposes itself to a loss rC in both states of nature if he refuses the offer.
Then UA = αy + RrC.
(ii) if C < y/r, then the highest such debt is (1− α)rC since d will be repaid by the
agent in state G even in the absence of support by P.
The agent’s maximal utility in the absence of default is:
UA(dL) = RdL + αy where dL ≡

(1− α)rC if rC < y
rC if rC > y
Suppose now that there is default only in state B. Then dH ≡ y+ rc is the maximum
debt that P is willing to help assume in state G, enforced by sanction c ≥ y. For a
sanction c ∈ [y, C], the agent’s utility is then R[α(y+ rc)]− (1− α)c and so the optimal
c is equal to C if Rαr > 1− α. On the other hand if Rαr < 1− α, the agent is better off
setting c = y and obtaining Rα(y + e)− (1− α)y.
Let κ ≡ y/C. When Rαr > 1− α, then
X if r < κ, RLF ≡

ακ + (1− α)
ακ + (2α− 1)r if ακ + (2α− 1)r > 0
+∞ otherwise
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X if r > κ, RLF ≡

ακ + (1− α)
ακ − (1− α)r if ακ + (α− 1)r > 0
+∞ otherwise
When Rαr < 1− α, then
X if r < κ, RLF ≡

1
α(1+ r)− (1− α) r
κ
if α(1+ r)− (1− α) r
κ
> 0
+∞ otherwise
X if r > κ, RLF ≡

1
α(1+ r)− r
κ
if α(1+ r)− r
κ
> 0
+∞ otherwise

Finally, let us show that in some region of the parameter space, the simple debt
contract is optimal. To show this, let us derive an upper bound on agent welfare,
UA = (R− 1)
[
αdGA + (1− α)dBA
]
+ αy +
[
αtG + (1− α)tB
]
−
[
αcGA + (1− α)cBA
]
,
where dωA is the agent’s reimbursement to the market in state ω, t
ω the transfer from
the principal and cωA the sanction. Feasibility in state B requires that d
B
A ≤ tB. Incentive
compatibility in state G requires that dGA − tG ≤ dGA − tG + cGA ≤ dBA − tB + cBA ≤ cBA.
Finally, let H ≤ rC denote the maximum expected hardship that can be imposed upon
the principal. Necessarily,
αtG + (1− α)(tB + rcBA) ≤ H.
Adding up the feasibility and incentive constraints (with weights 1− α and α) implies
that
αdGA + (1− α)dBA ≤ αtG + (1− α)tB + αcBA.
And so
UA ≤ (R− 1)αcBA + R[αtG + (1− α)tB] + αy− (1− α)cBA
≤ (R− 1)αcBA + R[H − (1− α)rcBA] + αy− (1− α)cBA
≤ [R [α− (1− α)r]− 1] cBA + αy + RH
≤ αy + RH ≤ αy + RrC
for R ≤ R∗. Thus, in case (i) above and for R ≤ R∗, the simple debt contract is optimal
in the class of all contracts.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Constraints (4) and (5) in the text ensure that the two parties do not want to collude
when the state is (G, G). Let us first discuss remaining collusion-proofness constraints,
those in state (B, B) and in state (G, B) (or equivalently (B, G). In state (B, B), mimick-
ing state (G, G) or state (G, B) is unfeasible if reimbursements are positive, which will
be the case except in the trivial case in which no borrowing is optimal.
In state (G, B), two further constraints must be satisfied. First, d1 + [(cˆG1 + cˆ
B
1 )/2] ≤
cˆ0 is a sufficient condition for the absence of gains from trade from mimicking (B, B)
(the necessary and sufficient condition is more complex as the collusive arrangement
must respect the truthtelling requirement). Second, if 2d2 ≤ y and d1 + [(cˆG1 + cˆB1 )/2] >
d2 + cˆ2, there are potential gains from masquerading as state (G, G). A sufficient condi-
tion for collusion-proofness is therefore that either 2d2 > y or that d1 + [(cˆG1 + cˆ
B
1 )/2] ≤
d2 + cˆ2.
One can check that IL and JL contracts are indeed collusion proof. Because both
contracts satisfy constraints (4) and (5), the countries’ welfares cannot be improved
in state (G, G). So consider state (G, B), say. State (G, G) cannot be mimicked under
IL (because total income y is lower than 2d2 = 2y) and does not bring any increase
in total surplus under JL (total reimbursement is y and there is no punishment under
(G, B) and under (G, G)). Similarly, declaring (B, B) brings about a reduction in total
surplus (2cˆ0 > 2d1 + cˆG1 + cˆ
B
1 ) in either case and so there is no possible gain from trade.
Finally, state (B, B), with no available income, cannot be misrepresented if there is any
reimbursement in the other states, which is the case.
Let us assume that borrowing (p1d1 + p2d2) is strictly positive.
First, we show that the truthtelling constraint (1) must be binding. If it is not, then
cˆ0 = d2. Suppose that (5) is not binding either; then d1 = y/2 and cˆG1 = cˆ
B
1 = 0. Either
(R− 1)p2 < p0 and then d2 = cˆ0 = 0 and then (1) is violated. Or (omitting non-generic
cases) (R− 1)p2 > p0 and then d2 = cˆ0 = y, violating (5).
So (5) must be binding if (1) is not. One can then rewrite the program as max {(R−
1)(p2d2 + p1d1) − p1(d2 − d1) − p0d2} subject to d2 ≤ y and 2d1 ≤ y. So d1 = y/2.
Either (R− 1)p2− p1− p0 < 0 and then d2 = 0, which contradicts the assumption that
(5) is binding; or (R− 1)p2− p1− p0 > 0 and then d2 = y and constraint (1) is violated
as cˆB1 (1+ r)/2 = y/2. We thus conclude that (1) must be binding.
Substituting (1) into the objective function and letting
A ≡ (R− 1) p1
2
− p0
and
B ≡ (R− 1)
(
p2 − p1r2
)
− p1
(1+ r
2
)
,
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the per-country utility becomes
U = Acˆ0 + BcˆB1
(i) d1 = d2 = 0 is optimal if A < 0 and B < 0.
(ii) Suppose that A > 0 and B > 0 (again we ignore non-generic cases for con-
ciseness). Then maximizing sanctions (so as to maximize borrowing) is optimal and
d2 = y = 2d1. Embodying (2) and (3) into (1), one must verify:
Ccˆ0 + DcˆB1 ≤ p2y +
p1
2
y (1’)
where C ≡ p1/2 and D = p2 − (p1r/2).
So either A/C > B/D and then minimum weight must be put on cˆB1 (relative to
cˆ0). Condition (5) is then binding, implying cˆB1 = y/(1 + r) and cˆ0 then determined
by (1’) satisfied with equality; the missing collusion-proofness constraints are then sat-
isfied. Or A/C < B/D and then a priori (4) is binding (cˆ0 = y) and cˆB1 is given by
(1’) satisfied with equality (cˆB1 = p2y/[p2 − (p1r/2)]). However, one of the missing
collusion-proofness constraints is then violated (that specifying d1 + (1+ r)cˆBL/2 ≤ cˆ0)
and must be reintroduced. But the optimal contract is still a quasi-IL contract.28 In
either case, the optimum is a quasi-IL contract. Note that
A
C
≥ B
D
⇐⇒ p0p2 − p
2
1
4
≤ p1
2
r
(
p0 +
p1
2
)
⇐⇒
( 1+ r
γ(1− γ)
) (1− ρ
ρ
)2
+
(2r
γ
) (1− ρ
ρ
)
≥ 4.
(iii) Suppose next that A > 0 > B, which can be rewritten as:
1+ r
2p2
p1
− r
> R− 1 > 2p0
p1
(which corresponds to r large and a low correlation index ρ). The fact that 0 > B calls
for cˆB1 = 0. Constraint (5) must then be binding and so d2 = d1 = y/2.
Constraint (1) yields
cˆ0 =
p2 + p1
p1
y.
Provided that cˆ0 ≤ cˆ, then the optimal contract is the joint liability contract. 
28In either case provided that the resulting values are smaller than cˆ. Otherwise one must add the
constraint that cˆ0 ≤ cˆ (respectively cˆB1 ≤ cˆ).
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